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ABSTRACT
The World Bank report Assessing Aid assumes that aid is more effective when it is given to
countries where polices are sound. Moreover, it assumes that an inflow of aid, above a certain
level, starts to have negative effects. In this paper we empirically test both assumptions. We
do not find evidence for the fact that aid becomes more effective when it is given to countries
with good policies. On the other hand, we find some evidence for negative returns to aid at
high levels of aid inflows. However, the results are sensitive to the countries considered as
well as the exact specification. Moreover, the turning point above which aid starts to have a
negative effect on growth seems to be much higher than assumed in the background
calculations for Assessing Aid
*The authors are at, respectively, the Faculty of Economics, University of Groningen
and the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. This paper is based
on work undertaken by the authors for the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
However, all opinions expressed are our own.2
1. INTRODUCTION
The World Bank report Assessing Aid argues that a reallocation of the
existing aid flows to poor countries with sound management would lift 18 million
more per year out of poverty (World Bank, 1998:16). This figure is based on
calculations by Collier and Dollar (1999) who aim to determine a poverty-efficient
allocation of aid. Their analysis assumes that aid becomes more effective if it is given
to countries with sound policies and that aid, above a certain level of inflows, starts
to have negative effects on growth (see Lensink and White, 2000a).
The main aim of this paper is to examine whether empirical evidence supports
the notion of negative effects of high aid inflows. In addition, we test whether aid
becomes more effective when it is given to countries with good policies. We first
document the phenomenon of rising aid levels (Section 2), before going on in Section
3 to present some arguments to illustrate why high levels of aid can be bad for the
recipient. The latter notion can be captured in the idea of the aid Laffer curve: that is,
the benefits from aid increase with initial inflows but after a certain level begin to
decline, so that the country would actually be better off with less aid. In Section 4 we
attempt empirical estimation of the aid Laffer curve. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE EMERGENCE OF HIGH AID INFLOWS
During the last two decades aid to some developing countries has grown to very high
levels. Whereas in the late 1970s only eight countries had aid to GNP ratios in excess
of 20 per cent, and none higher than 50 per cent, by the first half of the 1990s 26
countries had aid ratios of 20 per cent or more, with four countries having ratios
greater than 50 per cent. Aid per capita has shown a similar trend, with the number of
countries receiving over US$100 per person rising from 19 to 32 from the late 1970s
to the early 1990s, 12 countries receiving in excess of $250 per person in the later
period compared to five in the earlier.
1 The highest aid recipient in both periods, New
Caledonia, saw its aid inflow rise from an average of $670 each year for each person
in the 1970s to over US$2,000 a person in the first half of the 1990s. Aid donors
worry that such high levels of aid may signify, or induce, aid dependence, rather than
lay the basis for self-reliant development as aid is intended to. 
Tables 1 and 2 lists those countries having over certain threshold values of aid
flows, where aid flows are normalised by both GNP and population. Table 3(a) reports
the cumulative distributions from these data. Two features are notable from these data.
First, the number of countries receiving aid in excess of the threshold values shown
has been increasing over time, with a doubling in the number of countries receiving3
aid of $50 or more per capita and a more than threefold increase in those receiving aid
equivalent to at least  20 per cent of GNP.  Second, there has emerged a group of "very
high aid" recipients, receiving more aid per capita than the income per capita levels
of many developing countries. For several countries aid is 30 per cent or more of
GNP. Whilst none of these countries are large ones, the phenomenon of high aid is by
no means restricted to micro-states: countries such as Israel, Mozambique and
Nicaragua also feature in the tables.
An alternative presentation of these data is given by Table 3(b), which presents
summary statistics of box plots given in an earlier version of this paper (see Lensink
and White, 1999). There is clearly a group of very high recipients. At the same time
the median aid per capita has drifted up over time (from US$ 11 per person in 1975-79
to US$ 38 in 1990-95): by the later period the upper quartile had reached $80, so that
a quarter of developing countries were in receipt of aid in excess of this amount.
Whilst the median aid to GNP ratio has not risen in the same way, the upper quartile
has moved up, so that over one quarter of countries have aid ratios greater than 15 per
cent in the 1990s.
These data thus clearly support both the proposition that a greater number of
countries can be classified as high aid recipients in the 1990s than was the case in the
1970s, and that there has emerged a class of very high aid recipients. But do these
trends represent a problem? Or will extraordinary aid flows allow their recipients to
achieve their development objectives the sooner?
3. THE AID LAFFER CURVE
We do not provide a formal model for the existence of an aid Laffer curve, but offer
various reasons as to why it is possibly important.
2 Aid has always had its critics who
maintain that it does more harm than good. Milton Friedman supported military aid
to defend the "free world", but argued that the case for economic aid was based on
three basic propositions that are "at best misleading half-truths" (1958, reprinted in
1970: 67). He objected in particular to the idea that development required
comprehensive planning and control by government. Indeed, the contrary was the case
- that is, "what is required in the underdeveloped countries is the release of the
energies of millions of able, active, and vigorous people, ... [who] only require a
favourable economic environment to transform the face of their countries" (ibid: 71).
Hence aid will "almost surely retard economic development and promote the triumph
of Communism" (ibid: 64). Peter Bauer has persistently pursued this line of argument
over the years; for example:4
.. aid does not descend indiscriminately on the population at large, but
goes directly to the government. Because aid accrues to the government
it increases its resources, patronage, and power in relation to the rest of
society. The resulting politicization of life enhances the hold of
government over their subjects and increases the stakes in the struggle
for power. This result in turn encourages or even forces people to divert
attention, energy and resources from productive economic activities...
Foreign aid has also enabled many governments to pursue policies that
plainly retard economic growth and exacerbate poverty... (Bauer, 1991:
45-46).
Writers from the left, especially those employing a dependency theory
framework, have also been critical. In Andre Gunder Frank’s paper entitled Aid or
Exploitation? he argued that US assistance was "definitely prejudicial to Brazil"
(1963, reprinted in 1969: 160), since it facilitated a net outflow out of the country and
allowed the US to direct Brazilian development in a direction beneficial to US
interests. Starting with Aid as Imperialism (Hayter, 1971), Teresa Hayter has
published a series of works examining how aid harms the poor and the environment
to the benefit of Western interests and a small minority in developing countries (e.g.,
Hayter, 1989). Finally, Keith Griffin (1970, and Griffin and Enos, 1970) argued that
aid can harm growth, an effect which is produced by a combination of savings
displacement and an increase in the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) as a result
of the lower productivity of aid-financed investment.
We do not pursue these arguments here, although some of them may play some
role in explaining why aid’s net benefits may become negative at high levels of
inflows. Rather we are concerned to explore the possibility that aid may have not
merely decreasing returns (a proposition which everyone would surely accept) but that,
after a certain level, the returns to further aid inflows are negative. This idea, i.e. that
a country can get  "too much aid", can be captured in the idea of an aid Laffer curve.
Beneficial effects may of course refer to any of aid’s intended beneficial
impacts. A review of donor policy statements (see Lensink and White, 1997) shows
five themes common to many donors: (1) self-sustaining growth; (2) poverty
reduction; (3) environmental sustainability; (4) improving the position of women;
3 and
(5) good governance (democratisation etc.). Examination of the aid Laffer curve would
require estimation of the link between aid and some output measure related to each of5
these objectives. However, in practice we move rapidly into uncharted territory if we
attempt an overall assessment of aid’s impact in relation to any of these objectives. The
most effort has been put into the growth objective, and our empirical estimates in
Section 3 relate to this objective. But first we consider reasons as to why an aid Laffer
curve may exist.
Griffin (1970) gives a possible reason for the existence of an aid Laffer curve.
He argues that aid would reduce the productivity of investment so that, if this effect
were sufficiently large, then aid would reduce growth. In addition to Griffin’s
argument, contributions to the aid effectiveness literature have also pointed to
problems of absorptive capacity, which may suggest the inverse relationship between
aid and productivity which underlies the theoretical rationale for an aid Laffer curve.
Examples of studies  finding this phenomenon include:
·  Lavy and Sheffer (1991) examine the cases of Egypt, Syria and Jordan which
are now worse off, after years of very high aid inflows, than they were in the
early 1970s. The story of why this is so is as follow.  High aid inflows exceed
those which can feasibly be used in profitable investment and so some aid must
be consumed. This consumption usually takes the form of consumer subsidies
(and perhaps highly subsidised government services). When aid slackens these
policies are not readily reversible (a notion economists call hysteresis).  If
possible, the government will borrow to maintain consumption - which
postpones, but exacerbates, the eventual fiscal adjustment. Alternatively,
government may print money.  These problems are intensified by the fact that
aid-financed investments may not have been particularly profitable, and may
have discouraged private sector activity.
·  Zejan and Kokko’s analysis of aid to Guinea-Bissau finds that aid has financed
investment, but that "the total investment volume reflects levels of investment
which are too high with respect to the country’s management capability" (1998:
134).
·  Morton draws a similar conclusion from his analysis of Sudan, arguing that
donors are unwilling to accept that the poorest developing countries only have
the capacity to successfully implement a very limited number of development
projects; hence, he says, "the volume of aid just grows and grows without
regard for its chances of being put to productive use" (1994: 16).6
·  Sobhan (e.g. 1996) argues that aid is too high as the recipient government is
swamped by donors and so unable to direct its own development effort, to the
long run detriment of that development.
·  A review by ODC of Strengthening Aid in Africa argues that aid has been
allocated without regard for absorptive capacity:
The absorptive capacity of the recipient state, not some arbitrary
proportion of GNP of donor countries should determine the level
of aid a country receives... Given the low levels of development
in most African countries, low domestic savings, low government
capacity, and the levels of aid already often well above 10 per cent
of GNP, such estimates suggest that many African countries could
not absorb much more aid without further drops in long-term
effectiveness. (van de Walle and Johnston, 1996: 98).
·  Morss (1984) observed what he called "donor proliferation" and how this
phenomenon diverted government officials into "pleasing donors" rather than
pursuing their country’s development objectives.
From these studies a story emerges. There is a limit to how much aid a country
can "absorb" (i.e. have the capacity to manage).
4 That fact alone would suggest rapidly
diminishing returns to aid. But the situation is worse since the institutional destruction
of government’s proper functioning as its resources are diverted to managing the
burgeoning aid programme means that no aid is used effectively so that the return on
aid falls. Moreover, longer-run growth prospects are undermined as government
becomes embroiled in a network of aid-financed subsidies.
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS
Here we examine the aid Laffer curve empirically in relation to the growth objective.
Growth is chosen since it is a readily available output measure and we can draw on a
well-established approach to conduct our analysis. We present the estimation results
from growth regressions using the per capita growth of real GDP as the dependent
variable. The regression is a pooled cross-section time series analysis, using period
averages calculated from three five year periods (1975-79, 1980-84 and 1985-89) and7
one three year period (1990-92).  The main data source is World Bank (1997), though
the dependent variable comes from the Penn World Tables, with our time periods
determined by data availability from these sources. The basic panel consists of 138
countries (the countries used in Barro and Lee, 1994), from which we have included
only those countries which are aid recipients (see Appendix 1 for a list of countries).
5
Following the seminal work of Barro (1991), many studies have analysed the
determinants of economic growth. These studies report a large number of variables to
be correlated with growth. In principle, they could all be taken into account. However,
using extreme bound analysis (EBA), Levine and Renelt (1992), show that most of
these variables are not robust (i.e. their coefficients and significance can change
substantially depending which other variables are included in the estimated equation).
Therefore, we use EBA.
In the analysis the following cross-section regression is used:
g = aj + bij I + bmj M + bzj Z + m
where g is the per capita growth rate of GDP, I is a set of variables always included
in the regressions. M are the variables of interest. In our case, M is the aid/GDP ratio
and the aid/GDP ratio squared. Z is a subset of a vector of domestic and international
macroeconomic variables identified by past studies as being potentially important
explanatory variables of GDP growth.
The estimation procedure starts by determining a reasonable base model in
which the quadratic term for the aid/GDP ratio is not yet taken into account. First, we
have to decide on the vector of variables I. We take as I variables the initial level of
per capita income (GDPPC), the initial secondary-school enrolment rate (SENROLM),
the debt to GDP ratio (DEBTGDP), intercept dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa
(DUMSSH), Latin America (DUMLA), Asia (DUMASIE) and the different sub-periods
(DUM7579, DUM8084, DUM8589 and DUM9094, respectively).
6 GDPPC is
included to account for the conditional convergence effect. The sign is expected to be
negative. SENROLM proxies for the initial stock of human development. The sign is
expected to be positive. GDPPC and SENROLM are standard variables in recent
growth regressions. While DEBTGDP is not often included in growth regressions, it
is very often a variable of interest in studies on developing countries. Therefore, we
have included DEBTGDP in the set of I variables. The region dummies are often
found to be significant in growth regressions (see Sala-i-Martin, 1997) and are thus
included. The intercept dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, unlike8
Asia, are expected to be negative.
7 The time dummies are taken into account to correct
for possible fixed effects caused by the different sub-periods.
The first estimate we present contains all above mentioned I variables as well
as the Aid to GNP ratio (AIDGDP). The results are given by equation 1 in Table 4.
The equation confirms the relevance of the initial level of GDP, the Debt to GDP ratio,
quite a few dummies and the secondary enrolment rate for economic growth. This
result is in line with theory and hence quite satisfactory. Most importantly, the aid
variable is significant and has the expected sign. However, the Jarque-Bera (JB) test
shows that the residuals of equation 1  are not normally distributed.
8 Therefore, we
reestimated the equations by deleting  extreme outliers. The results are given by
equation 2 in Table 4. The Jarque-Bera now suggests that the residuals are normally
distributed. In the other estimates presented in this paper, we use the data set without
the extreme outliers.
Before we add a quadratic term for the aid/GDP ratio we consider two issues
which are emphasized in recent growth regressions with aid. First, some studies by
Boone (1994, 1996) and a recent study by Burnside and Dollar (1997) suggest that
one should instrument the aid/GDP ratio in order to account for the possible
endogeneity of aid. Second, Burnside and Dollar (1997) show that foreign aid only
significantly affects aid in good policy environments, implying that the aid term should
be interacted with a policy variable. We consider both issues in turn.
We first examined whether the aid variable should be instrumented. We
estimated different equations for AIDGNP, which are presented in Table 5. We
regressed AIDGNP on all exogenous variables from the base regression (equation 2
in Table 4) in addition to some combination of the size of the population (POP), the
mortality rate (MORTAL), a variable for political rights (PRIGHTS), the debt service
ratio (DEBTSERV) and a variable denoting civil liberties (CIVIL). These variables are
suggested by other studies as good instruments for AID.
9 Since the fitted value of the
different estimates for AIDGNP (FITAIDGNP) is insignificant when it is taken into
account as an additional independent variable in the growth regressions, the null is
accepted, and hence AIDGNP may be considered exogenous.
10 Based on these results
we decided not to instrument for AIDGNP and perform the rest of the analysis by
using the base models without instruments as presented in Table 4.
11
The next issue we considered is the efficiency of aid in a good policy
environment. It has recently been argued in the World Bank report Assessing Aid
(World Bank, 1998) that aid only works when the policy environment is right: this
finding being based on a growth regression in which aid is insignificant but the9
interactive variable, aid times policy, significant.
12 Burnside and Dollar (1997) (which
is the background paper from which the growth regressions in Assessing Aid are taken)
construct a combined policy variable consisting of a variable proxiing for trade
openness (TRADE), inflation (INFL) and the budget surplus (BUDSURP).
1314 We
follow their approach. The first column in Table 7 presents the results when TRADE,
INFL and BUDSURP are added to the base model. We used the coefficients for
TRADE, INFL and BUDSURP as given in equation 1 of Table 7 to construct a
combined policy index. In equation 2 of Table 7 we reestimate the base model with
AIDGNP and AIDGNP interacted with the policy index (POL). We also ran
regressions in which AIDGNP is only interacted with one of the policy variables.
Results are given by equations 3 and 4 in Table 7. These results give a consistent
picture: the policy variables TRADE and INFL are significant, in general AIDGNP is
significant, but the interaction term with AIDGNP is never significant. Whilst
Assessing Aid does find this interactive term to be significant, it is not found to be so
 here, neither is it in the model of Henrik and Tarp (1999), who attempted to replicate
the Assessing Aid results, or in estimates for sub-Saharan Africa by White (1997).
Hence the significant interactive policy term is a far from robust finding, and so, based
on these results we do not interact AIDGNP with a policy index, or one of the policy
variables, in the remainder of the paper.
       After this short digression, we come back to the main issue of this paper and that
is to examine whether there exists an aid Laffer curve. In order to do this we extend
our base model with a quadratic term for AIDGNP (AIDGNP2). The results are given
by equation 3 and 4 in Table 4. Equation 3 estimates the model for all observations.
This equation gives an insignificant estimate for the quadratic term. However, again
the residuals are not normally distributed. If we reestimate the equation by only taking
into account the observations used for equation 2, the results indeed confirm the
existence of an aid-Laffer curve (see equation 4). It should be noted, however, that the
insignificance of the quadratic term for the model using all observations suggests that
the result is quite sensitive to the countries included in the estimate.
The estimates presented in Table 4 may suffer from omitted variable bias since
some relevant variables may not be taken into account. To test the reliability of the
above results, the estimations as presented by equation 4 in Table 4 are extended by
adding a group of domestic and international macroeconomic variables. The selection
of the set of domestic and international macroeconomic variables - the Z-variables -
 is based on those identified by Sala-i-Martin (1997) as being important for economic
growth. The following variables were included in the various models estimated:10
1.  Political variables: we consider an index for civil liberties (CIVIL) and index of
political rights (PRIGHTS).
2.  In accordance with other recent studies (e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 1996), we
include policy variables to measure market distortions. We used the black
market premium (BMP), the inflation rate (INFL), the standard deviation of
inflation (STDINFL) and the ratio of the budget surplus to GDP (BUDSURP).
3. Measure of Openness. We have included the trade to GDP ratio (TRADE).
4. Financial development indicators. We include two proxies for financial
development: the money and quasi money to GDP ratio (MONGDP) and credit
to the private sector as % of GDP (CREDITPR).
5. Capital flows. In the analysis we have also taken into account a linear and a
quadratic term for total private capital flows (% of GDP) averaged over 5-year
periods (CAPFLO and CAPFLO2).
6.  We also consider the Life expectancy at birth (LIFEE), the primary enrolment
rate (PRENROLM), the debt service ratio (DEBTSERV) and the mortality rate
(MORTAL).
This means that in total 15 variables are included in the Z vector. In the regressions,
all combinations of three of the above-presented set of 15 variables are taken into
account. This implies that 455 estimates have been done. It also means that 15
independent variables are taken into account in all regressions. 
The procedure of the EBA is as follows. For each regression j, we find an
estimate bmj and a standard deviation smj. The lower extreme bound is the lowest value
of bmj - 2smj, whereas the upper bound is bmj + 2smj. If the upper extreme bound for
variable M is positive and the lower extreme bound is negative (i.e. the sign of the
coefficient bmj changes), then variable M is not robust. Results are presented in Table
8.
The above results show that according to the extreme bound analysis test, both
the linear term for aid and the quadratic term is fragile in the two groups of estimates.
Sala-i-Martin (1997) criticizes the EBA analysis of Levine and Renelt (1992)
for using too strict a test and presents an alternative stability analysis. His analysis
comes down to looking at the entire distribution of the coefficient b, instead of a zero-
one (robust-fragile) decision and calculating the fraction of the cumulative distribution
function lying on each side of zero. By assuming that the distribution of the estimates
of the coefficients is normal and calculating the mean and the standard deviation of11
this distribution, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) can be calculated. His
methodology starts by computing the point-estimates of b and the standard deviation





















The mean estimate of b and the average standard error are the mean and the standard
deviation of the assumed normal distribution. Finally, by using a table for the
(cumulative) NORMAL distribution, it can be calculated which fraction of the
cumulative distribution function is on the right or left hand side of zero. In Table 10
CDF denotes the Largest of the two areas. For this it does not matter whether this area
is below or above zero.
Table 9 shows that the linear and quadratic term are robust according to this
stability test. A closer look at the results per estimated equation shows that in more
than 90 % of all regressions AIDGNP is significant at the 5% level, whereas the
quadratic term is significant at the 5% level in only about 40 percent of all the
regressions. Therefore, although our study suggests that an aid Laffer curve exists, and
hence provides some empirical evidence for a negative effect of high aid inflows, the
result is quite sensitive to the exact specification of the model.
If there are diminishing returns to aid, it is important to know the turning point,
that is the aid to GNP ratio above which more aid has a negative marginal impact on
growth. The turning-point can be calculated by dividing the linear term by minus two
times the quadratic term. Based on the average coefficients for the entire set of
estimates the turning point of the aid to GNP ratio is about 50%. Hence, although
there are indeed indications of the existence of an aid Laffer curve, our study suggests
that the turning point is high (although some countries do receive aid at such levels).
16
It is interesting to compare our results with the results of the few other studies
considering a quadratic term for aid. The studies we are aware of are: Hadjimichael
et al (1995), with an implied turning point of about 25%, Durbarry et al (1998) with
an implied turning point of 51% and Hansen and Tarp (1999), with an implied turning
point of 0.25!. The coefficients used by Collier and Dollar (1999) in their poverty-
efficient reallocation of aid calculations would imply a turning point of 3.7 per cent.
It should be taken into account that their estimate for the aid/GDP ratio uses PPP
values for GDP, whereas we have scaled aid by normal dollar values of GDP. If we
assume that, on average, the PPP value for GDP is 5 times the normal value of GDP,12
their estimate for the turning point would be about 18.5%. This is much lower than the
turning point implied by our study, as well as the studies by Hadjimichael et al (1995)
and Durbarry et al (1998), but much higher than the implied turning point found by
Hansen and Tarp (1999).
5. CONCLUSIONS
The World Bank report Assessing Aid assumes that aid is more effective when it is
given to countries where polices are sound. Moreover, it assumes that an inflow of aid,
above a certain level, starts to have negative effects. In this paper we empirically test
both assumptions. We do not find evidence for the fact that aid becomes more
effective when it is given to countries with good policies. On the other hand, we find
some evidence for negative returns to aid at high levels of aid inflows. However, the
results are sensitive to the countries considered as well as the exact specification.
Moreover, the turning point above which aid starts to have a negative effect on growth
seems to be much higher than assumed in the background calculations for Assessing
Aid.  We do not intend to argue that our estimate is the right one and that the estimates
used by the World Bank are wrong. Rather, the main point is that results seem to be
very sensitive to model specification and sample selection. Therefore, in our view,
much more research is needed in order to develop a good base on which policy
decisions can be made.
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Appendix 1  Countries in data set
Algeria Kenya Tanzania Panama Hong Kong Cyprus
Angola Lesotho Togo St. Lucia India Greece
Benin Liberia Tunisia St. Vincent Indonesia Hungary
Botswana Madagascar Uganda Trinidad Iran Malta
Burkina FasoMalawi Zaire Argentina Iraq Poland
Burundi Mali Zambia Bolivia Israel Fiji
Cameroon Mauritania Zimbabwe Brazil Jordan PNG
Cape Verde Mauritius Bahamas, The Chile South Korea Solomon Islands
CAR Morocco Barbados Colombia Kuwait Tonga
Chad Mozambique Costa Rica Ecuador Malaysia Vanuatu
Comoros Niger Dominica Guyana Nepal Western Samoa
Congo Nigeria Dom. Republic Paraguay Oman
Egypt Rwanda El Salvador Peru Pakistan
Ethiopia Senegal Grenada Suriname Philippines
Gabon Seychelles Guatemala Uruguay Saudi Arabia
The Gambia Sierra Leone Haiti Venezuela Singapore
Ghana Somalia Honduras Afghanistan Sri Lanka
Guinea South Africa Jamaica Bahrain Syrian Arab Republic
Guinea-Bissa
u
Sudan Mexico Bangladesh Thailand
Cote d’IvoireSwaziland Nicaragua China United Arab Emirates17
Appendix 2  List of variables and sources
GDPPC Real GDP per capita (1985 international prices) from Summers
and Heston, the Penn World Tables (Mark 5.5 and Mark 5.6).
Data for 1970-1989 (Mark 5.5) are taken from Barro and Lee
(1994). Data for 1990-1992 (Mark 5.6) are taken from Penn
World Tables, 1994. For estimation starting values for each 5
years’ sub-period are used.
PCGROWTH Per Capita Growth Rate of Real GDP. In the estimates, average
growth rates over sub-periods of 5 years are used (except for the
last period, which refers to 3 years). The growth rates are
calculated from Real GDP per capita figures of the Summers and
Heston (Penn World Table) datset. For sources see GDPPC.
PRIGHTS Index of political rights (from 1 to 7; 1=most freedom). Taken
from Barro and Lee (1994). The figures used refer to five year
averages. Since latest data available refer to 1985-1990, we have
lagged the variable with 5 years.
SENROLM Gross enrolment ratio for secondary education. Taken from World
Bank (1997).
CREDITPR Credit to private sector (% of GDP). Taken from World Bank
(1997).
DEBTGDP Total external debt (% of GDP). Calculated by using figures for
DEBT and GDP, both in current US$. Taken from World Bank
(1997).
STDINFL Standard deviation of inflation (calculated from GDP deflators)
for each five years’ sub-period. Inflation figures are taken from
World Bank (1997)
CAPFLO Total net private capital flows (% of GDP). The figures refer to
averages for five years’ sub-periods. Figures for total private
capital flows and GDP (both denominated in current US$) are
from World Bank (1997).18
CAPFLO2 Squared value of CAPFLO
AIDGNP Foreign aid (% of GNP). We have used starting values for each
five years’ sub-period. Taken from World Bank (1997)
AIDGNP2 Squared value of AIDGNP
TRADE Trade (exports plus imports) (% of GDP). Taken from World
Bank (1997)
INVGDP Gross domestic investments (% of GDP). Taken from World
Bank (1997).
DUM7579 Dummy for first five years’ sub-period
DUM8084 Dummy for second five years’ sub-period
DUM8589 Dummy for third five years’ sub-period
DUM9094 Dummy for last five years’ sub-period
DUMASIE Dummy for Asian countries
DUMLA Dummy for Latin American countries
DUMSSH Dummy for Sub-Saharan African countriesTable 1  Aid levels classified by aid by per capita
1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-95











New Caledonia (1487), French
Polynesia (1457), Grenada
(381), Israel (349), Seychelles
(348), Netherlands Antilles
(326), Cape Verde (276),
Vanuatu (257)
New Caledonia (2090), French
Polynesia (1614), Sao Tome and
Principe (472), Netherlands
Antilles (386), Micronesia (352),
Cape Verde (321), Western
Somoa (310), Tonga (304),
Seychelles (294), Vanuatu (281),
Israel (263), Kiribati (254)












(207), Cape Verde (198),
Tonga (180), Suriname (161),
Western Somoa (153),
Solomon Islands (123), Syria
(123), Comoros (119),
Mauritania (114), Oman
(113), Botswana (106), Papua
New Guinea(101)
Kiribati (228), Dominica (224),
Dijbouti (220), St Kitts and
Nevis (209), Sao Tome and
Principe (205), Tonga (202),
Western Somoa (176), Jordan
(169), Solomon Islands (146),
Belize (140), Comoros (122),
St. Vincent (119), Equatorial
Guinea (116), Botswana (114),
Mauritania (113), Gabon (108),
The Gambia (105), Maldives
(100)
Dijbouti (236), Dominica (224),
St. Lucia (174), St Kitts and
Nevis (165), Suriname (165), St.
Vincent (165), Jordan (159),
Grenada (151), Maldives (148),
Nicaragua (141), Bahrain (138),
Equatorial Guinea (137), Guyana
(137), Solomon Islands (131),
Gabon (127), Belize (124),
Guinea-Bissau (123), Zambia
(118), Mauritania (116),
Namibia (107), Comoros (106)
A/P>$50











Belize (87), St Kitts and
Nevis (87), Sao Tome and
Principe(86), Gabon (82)
Antigua and Barbuda (81),
Malta (81), The Gambia (78),
Lebanon (75), Guinea-Bissau
(74), Jamaica (74), St.
Vincent (72), Lesotho (69),
Maldives (68), St. Lucia (62),
Swaziland (60), Barbados
(57), Liberia (56), Senegal
(56), Somalia (55), Yemen
(55), Costa Rica (54), Fiji
(54), Congo (53)  Guyana
(52), Cyprus (52), Grenada
(51)
Guinea-Bissau (99), St. Lucia
(91), Papua New Guinea (87),
Antigua and Barbuda (84),
Jamaica (83), El Salvador (81),
Costa Rica (80), Senegal (80),
Bahrain (77), Bhutan (67),
Lesotho (64), Honduras (60),
Central African Republic (59),
Suriname (58), Cyprus (58),
Fiji (58), Zambia (58), Somalia
(56), Bolivia (54), Mauritius
(52), Mali (51)
Bhutan (98), Papua New Guinea
(93), Botswana (88), The
Gambia (86), Bolivia (86),
Yugoslavia (84), Senegal (83),
Mozambique (78), Congo (73),
Cote d’Ivoire (71), Lesotho (70),
Albania (69), Rwanda (68), Fiji
(67), Antigua and Barbuda (67),
Honduras (66), El Salvador (65),
Egypt (65), Swaziland (64),
Guinea (62), Jamaica (60),
Central African Republic (60),
Somalia (57), Malawi (55),
Benin (53), Poland (52),
Mongolia (51), Mali (50)
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 1997Table 2  Aid levels classified by ratio of aid to GNP
1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-95
A/Y> 0.5 - Cape Verde (57), Somalia
(56)
Guinea-Bissau (57), Cape
Verde (56), Somalia (50)




















































Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 1997Table 3(a)  Cumulative distributions of aid per capita and aid as a per
cent of GNP
1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92
Aid per capita
A/P > $50 31 47 47 60
A/P > $100 19 21 26 32
A/P > $250 5 9 8 12
Aid as a per cent of GNP
A/Y > 20 % 8 14 18 26
A/Y > 30 % 5 6 8 12
A/Y > 50 % 0 2 3 4
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 1997Table 3(b)  Summary statistics of aid per capita and aid as a per cent
of GNP
1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92
Aid per capita
Lower quartile 2.0 1.8 2.4 10.5
Median 11.0 19.2 22.5 38.3
Upper quartile 34.5 55.5 58.3 79.5
Inter-quartile range 32.5 53.7 55.9 69
n 152 160 159 162
Aid as a per cent of GNP
Lower quartile 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.6
Median 3.8 4.9 3.3 4.0
Upper quartile 10.6 10.2 10.6 16.2
Inter-quartile range 9.9 9.6 10.5 15.6
n 109 126 148 152
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 1997Table 4  Base model and Laffer curve estimates








































































































2 0.22 0.31 0.22 0.31
SSR 3468.339 2357.714 3463.39 2339.161
SDDV 3.943 3.5678 3.943 3.5678
MDP 0.766 0.8405 0.766 0.8405
JB 104.33 3.58 111.13 3.53
Obs. 296 278 296 278
Notes: SSR= Sum squared residuals; SDDV is standard deviation dependent variable; MDP is mean
dependent variable; JB = Jarque-Bera test statistic; Obs. = amunt of observations. The estimates are
done with white heteroscedastic consistent standard errors. This applies to all tables.Table 5  Determination of instruments: dependent variable AIDGNPS
Inst 1 Inst 2 Inst 3
GDPPC -0.00017 (-0.73) -0.00064 (-1.72) -0.00021 (-0.87)
SECENROL -0.1295 (-3.09) -0.1563 (-3.42) -0.1287 (-3.07)
DEBTGDP 0.0486 (2.66) 0.1036 (3.45) 0.0485 (2.66)
DUM7579 10.499 (2.38) 17.389 (3.48) 10.591 (2.39)
DUM8084 12.660 (2.59) 20.247 (3.62) 12.696 (2.59)
DUM8589 11.422 (2.31) 18.430 (3.44) 11.186 (2.26)
DUM9094 11.596 (2.49) 18.320 (3.64) 11.478 (2.45)
DUMA 1.633 (0.93) -0.199 (-0.11) 1.550 (0.88)
DUMLA -4.746 (-3.60) -4.571 (-3.23) -4.747 (-3.58)
DUMASIE -2.905 (-2.22) -3.852 (-2.53) -3.310 (-2.51)
POP -4.23E-09 (-2.86) -5.27E-09 (-3.53) -4.41E-09 (-2.76)
MORTAL -0.012 (-0.43) -0.047 (-1.49) -0.008 (-0.29)




2 0.33 0.40 0.33
Obs. 278 254 278Table 6  Estimate with instruments: dependent variable PCGROWTH 
Inst 1 Inst 2 Inst 3
GDPPC -0.00020 (-1.74) -2.85E-05 (-0.14) -0.00021 (-1.85)
SECENROL 0.0697 (1.79) 0.0212 (1.15) 0.0531 (1.93)
DEBTGDP -0.0370 (-2.19) -0.0221 (-3.19) -0.0300 (-2.34)
DUM7579 -0.7583 (-0.27) 1.9758 (1.80) 0.4711 (0.24)
DUM8084 -4.6854 (-1.35) -1.4459 (-1.15) -3.1579 (-1.29)
DUM8589 -2.1835 (-0.71) 0.9845 (0.80) -0.8238 (-0.38)
DUM9094 -2.5928 (-0.82) 0.5082 (0.38) -1.2030 (-0.53)
DUMA -1.4682 (-1.82) -1.2173 (-1.79) -1.2364 (-1.76)
DUMLA 1.5315 (0.98) -0.1008 (-0.14) 0.8781 (0.75)
DUMASIE 3.9299 (3.44) 2.6207 (3.73) 3.4405 (3.78)
AIDGNP 0.0752 (3.36) 0.0624 (2.53) 0.0747 (3.33)
FITAIDGNP 0.3563 (1.14) 0.0809 (0.94) 0.2155 (0.99)
Adj. R
2 0.31 0.28 0.31
Obs. 278 254 278Table 7  Estimates with policy interactive term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDPPC -0.000464 (-4.01) -0.00043 (-3.76) -0.00025 (-2.20) -0.00034 (-3.01)
SECENROL 0.0174 (1.41) 0.0261 (2.04) 0.0298 (2.29) 0.0226 (1.78)
DEBTGDP -0.0288 (-3.81) -0.0320 (-4.35) -0.0204 (-3.35) -0.0216 (-3.72)
DUM7579 3.6295 (4.55) 2.9511 (3.57) 2.3275 (3.05) 2.0664 (2.69)
DUM8084 1.0230 (1.21) 0.2639 (0.30) -0.8192 (-1.02) -0.9762 (-1.21)
DUM8589 3.5132 (3.77) 2.7818 (2.97) 1.3402 (1.49) 1.2504 (1.40)
DUM9094 2.9143 (2.84) 2.0829 (1.91) 1.0998 (1.11) 0.8893 (0.89)
DUMA -1.4422 (-2.11) -1.4010 (-1.99) -0.8605 (-1.32) -1.1950 (-1.83)
DUMLA -0.1846 (-0.30) 0.1683 (0.27) 0.1239 (0.21) 0.0500 (0.09)
DUMASIE 1.4372 (2.49) 1.7979 (2.91) 2.6497 (4.75) 2.3888 (4.24)
INFL -0.0023 (-3.00) -0.0022 (-2.85) -0.0026 (-2.95)
BUDSURP 0.0738 (1.33) 0.0113 (3.12)
TRADE 0.0134 (3.51) 0.0858 (1.37) 0.0131 (3.43)











2 0.36 0.37 0.31 0.32

























BUDDEF, CAPFLO, MORTAL Fragile
Note: AV= additional variables, SE= standard error. Row 2 and 3 refer to estimates for which INVGDP is not
included in I vector. Row 5 and 6 present the results for estimates where INVGDP is included. Note that the amount
of observations are not exactly the same in the different estimates due to lacking data. The amount of observations
varies between 250 and 278.Table 9  An Alternative Stability Test
Variable R
2 CDF Perc
AIDGNP 0.36 0.1736 0.05729 0.999 0.96
AIDGNP2 0.36 -0.00175 0.001014 0.958 0.39
Note: perc denotes the percentage of regressions that variable is significant at 5% level.Notes 
                    
1 These data are of course in nominal terms. However, IMF data show that the dollar-based import
price index for the developing countries (the most appropriate deflator for aid flows from their point of
view) to have risen by only ten to twenty per cent over this period.
2 In Lensink and White (1999) a simple endogenous growth model is presented which incorporates an
aid Laffer curve.
3 Several agencies couch this objective in terms of gender, although their actual concerns are linked to
women’s position rather than gender per se.
4 Our story does not distinguish types of aid. It is of course clear that some types of aid, notably debt
relief, require rather less management capacity than others. Though even debt relief has associated
Consultative Group meetings to prepare for and attend and donor monitoring and evaluation
requirements to satisfy.
5 The number of observations for the regressions is less than 4 times the number of countries on
account of the absence of data for some countries.
6 Many studies use the log of the initial value for GDP per capita. We have used the normal value of
GDP per capita since that gave somewhat better results in terms of significance. 
7 Some have argued (e.g. Krugman, 1994) that the success of the East Asian economies can be
accounted for by factor inputs alone. Hence if these variables are included then the dummy variables
may not be significant.
8 Under the null hypothesis of normality this test is chi-squared distributed with two degrees of
freedom. It should be lower than 5.99 to be significant at the five per cent level.
9 We also tried other instruments as well, including the donor dummy used by Boone. For reasons of
space, and because of the fact that they were not significant we have not presented them.
10 This is a version of the Hausman test for endogeneity (see Mukherjee et al., 1998).
11 It was indeed argued long ago by Mosley (1980) that it is unlikely that aid is endogenous with
respect to growth (rather than the level of income).
12 An extended discussion of Assessing Aid may be found in Lensink and White (2000b).
13 Note that Burnside and Dollar use another proxy for trade openness and that their specification is
different.
14 We also tested the product of the policy variable with the square of aid (which is the form used by
Burnside and Dollar), but again found insignificant results.
15 Sala-i-Martin uses a weigthed average with the likelihoods as weights. He shows that results of his
empirical analysis do not differ very much when an unweighted average is used.
16 Since only a few countries in our data set have Aid to GDP ratios above 50% , and hence only a few
countries pick up the downward part of the Laffer curve, it might be argued that our study primarily
gives evidence for diminishing, but not negative, returns to aid.